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CRIME AND THE SOCIAL REACTION OF
RIGHT AND WRONG1
A

STUDY

IN CLINICAL SOCIOLOGY

TRIGANT BuRRow,

M.D., Ph.D. 2

I.
As one considers the turmoil of things in the world today, two
phenomena stand out as being of major importance. One is the
existence throughout society of a condition of economic insecurity,
the other of a condition of ethical instability. These two phenomena
represent in reality an acute phase or crisis in a condition which has
marked the clinical history of man from a very early period. The
two conditions, though occurring simultaneously, would seem to have
arisen quite independently of one another. The marked disturbance
in economic values and the equally marked disturbance in moral
values appear to be quite unrelated. Certainly the economists and
students of ethics, in, their efforts thus far to solve our social difficulties, have dealt with these two problems as quite separate disorders possessing no intrinsic bond of connection between them. In
the present moment of social discord and confusion, an approach
which postulates an essential identity between these two spheres of
human conduct may offer certain features which are not without
interest.
Science, as it surveys the surface appearance of structures to be
investigated, does not concern itself only with the superficial manifestations of these Structures, but seeks to discover the hidden element accountable for the obvious appearances. 3 In social disorders,
however, in economic competition and conflict, the obvious is still at
'Paper read in its original outline before the Section on Legal Psychology,

The Ninth International Congress of Psychology, Yale University, Septem-

ber 3, 1929. This study in somewhat altered form is part of a larger thesis,
"The Structure of Crime," which will appear later in book form and will
further develop the theme contained in "The Structure of Insanity," Psyche
Miniatures, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1932.
Other writings of the author in a similar vein may be of assistance to the
reader. Reference has therefore been made to these earlier studies in the course
of the
2 present essay.
Scientific Director of The Lifwynn Foundation, New York City.
8"Physiological Behavior-Reactions in the Individual and the Community,"
Psyche (London), 1930, Vol. XI, No. 2, pp. 67-81.
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a premium; man has not yet developed a technique for isolating the
element or hidden causative factor answerable for these disturbances.'
In the sphere of human affairs, everyone prefers to assume that he
possesses authority on the strength of what he already knows rather
than seek authority in causes which are still unknown. Experimental
evidence indicates that the subtle cause or element inseparable from
the driving urge toward general social competition and disorder is
traceable to the existence of a factor in man that as yet lies hidden
from him. Evidence further indicates that in searching for the cause
of this hidden factor underlying social competition and conflict our
surest clue lies in the field of investigation that has to do with those
principles which constitute man's moral and ethical codes.
In his scientific preoccupation thus far man has concerned himself exclusively with investigations into the phenomena of the external world, with the objects and events that exist about him. The
present theme relates to phenomena which are subjective and internal. It relates to the results of researches into those feelings and
reactions which exist within the organism of man himself and which
are the very springs of his conduct. Accordingly, following some
years of scientific study of human relations, it proposes what must
seem the preposterous view that the commonly accepted sense or
sensation of "right and wrong" governing normal behavior is identical with the sense of "right and wrong" governing the behavior
of the criminal and the insane and that this normal standard of
evaluation is therefore false and undependable as a measure of human
conduct.
II.

Crime, like insanity, is a disorder of the individual that implicates society at large. The outstanding symptom invariably present in
both these disorders is found in the individual's reaction to sensations of right and wrong. As we know, the sensations and reactions
embodied in otr feelings of right and wrong are expressive of the
relationship of individuals to one another. In the absence of interindividual relationships there could be no sensations of right and
wrong. The condition is social. To say that the condition is social
means that in our human interchange the conformity or fitness we
4
Weeks, Arland D., "Will there be an Age of Social Invention?" Scientific Monthly, October, 1932.
"In human relations there has not been the slightest employment of the
scientific method. Instead there has been stubborn resistance to change which
is thoroughly unscientific." B. E. Schaar, "Scientific Method and Social Relations," Science, December 16, 1932.
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designate by the word "right" represents a correspondence or agreement that is based upon an outer sign or symbol. It means that the
accord we designate as "right" rests upon the mental and social systems of inter-communication we express in language or external
code-that it does not rest upon an inherent, biological fitness or
organic agreement, as we have come unwittingly to assume, but upon
an outer sign or mental image of agreement belonging to man's
more recent symbolic, cerebral equipment. So that the confidence or
trust in which man's understanding or accord now reposes is based
upon a merely external, social or symbolic sense of right rather than
upon a sense of biological order and fitness intrinsic to man's organism.5
Whether in civilized man or in savage, in the educated or the
uneducated, in neurotic or normal, this external sense of right, this
symbolic, dissociated criterion of conduct, in- whatever form it may
exist, governs all our human relationships; it permeates all our
thinking and feeling, and the evidences of its pathology press upon
us on every hand. Though man prides himself upon his analytic
acuity and upon his powers of scientific observation, he has yet to
turn about and face the meaning within him of this ever-present
social reflex. When a sense of right does not conform to his wishes
he does not challenge the social basis of his "right" but, merely
shifting to a seemingly opposite position, he gives it its other name
and calls it "wrong." But it is idle to run to cover with the cry
that such and such is "wrong." Wrong is merely the private sense
of "right" that one is caught in by a sufficient number of people
maintaining a sense of right contrary to one's own.
I-ow uncertain a basis this is, how lacking in scientific criteria
and how incompetent man is to reckon with his own blindness with
respect to this common measure of mankind called "right," may be
seen in the outstanding instance of war. And as with war, with its
clash of equally "right" and irreconcilable forces, so with the issues
constantly involved in our more intimate social interrelations. For
this rightness that exists socially in the normal individual is as fixed
and as adamant as the rightness that exists clinically in the selfvindicatory paranoiac. It may no more be argued with in the one
than in the other. It is omnipotent and inaccessible. 6
Let us take a typical case-the situation in which this sense of
W'Social Images versus Reality," Journal of Abnormal Psychology and
Social Psychology, October-December, 1924, Vol. XIX, No. 3, pp. 230-235.
6
The Social Basis of Consciousness, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company; London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Company, 1927.
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"right" prevailing in normal society is seen in its acutest phase. A
man is being tried in court for a murder committed, let us say, for
motives of economic gain. The consensus of the State or community
is that the accused (assuming him to be of sound mind) knew
clearly what was right and did not do what he clearly knew to be
right. In this position at least the community is unanimous. If
with a view to his private gain the prisoner committed murder, he
did not do what was right. Such is the accepted legal view.
Now in a scientific inquiry any assumption or premise is at least
tentatively permissible. And so, laying aside legal, moral, traditional
interpretations, let us assume, for the sake of a scientific test, that
every individual acts only in accord with what is "right" and that
therefore the accused possessed also this sensation or feeling subjectively experienced as a sense of right. Let us assume that at the
moment of committing the crime the accused felt his crime to be
right, that the economic advantage to himself rendered his act right
and justified in his own feeling. This may seem a somewhat novel
assumption-the assumption that one does at all times only what is
right-but even upon a superficial analysis we shall find it to be by
no means as novel as it appears. We shall find that we accept this
assumption quite readily where it comports with our own personal
interests and their social guarantees. In fact we cannot find more
telling instances in which we assume individual conduct to- be motivated at all times by a sense of right than in the procedure of the
very court in question.
For example, no one would deny that the attorneys on the opposing sides feel themselves to be doing what is right-the one side
on behalf of the State, the other on behalf of the defense. But
from the standpoint of a scientific criterion-from the standpoint of
a biological accord or fitness-it is obvious that they cannot both be
doing what is right, since the two are taking exactly opposite positions. The attorneys for the State experience a sense of right in
resorting to every effort to secure the condemnation of the prisoner.
With this intent they feel it right to bias the judgment of the jury
through rousing their emotions to the highest pitch of indignation,
and they do this notwithstanding that it was precisely a bias of judg-,
ment due to an emotional over-stimulation that led to the crime of
which the prisoner stands accused. On the other hand, the attorneys
for the accused are inspired by an equal sense of right and, in their
efforts to present arguments in his defense that will incite the jury
to a favorable verdict, they seek quite as deliberately to stimulate the
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jury to the highest point of emotional "sympathy" or partisanship.

Or suppose we assume that there is doubt whether the prisoner
is of sound mind-that the case is one in which the defense bases
its plea upon insanity. In this circumstance we have the not uncommon situation in which eminent psychiatrists of equal experience and
training are presented with identical clinical material, and yet, of
these able, sincere and representative men, each group will hold an
entirely opposite opinion from the other in regard to the data before
them, and this opinion will, on each side, be based equally upon its
sense of "right." For one group will "swear" and bring their utmost
scientific resources to prove that by every known criterion of science
the man is sane; the other group, equally gifted and likewise of the
highest integrity, will reconcile it with their sense of right to present
7
a completely contrary opinion.
It is clear then that both attorneys and psychiatrists may possess
a definite sense of right and yet this sense of right may afford no
guarantee of a scientific basis of judgment. If legal experts and
recognized psychiatric authorities may have this sense of right and
yet lack a consistent stabilized criterion of procedure in their own
special fields, if they may preserve a sense of right and yet not be
dependable in their professional judgment, is it not to be expected
that the accused, who is but a layman, might well have a sense of
right also and yet not be dependable in his judgment?
What then is this sensation of right that is so prevalent among
us socially? Could it be that the sensation of right about which we
hear so much and which is the basis of our education, of religion, of
law, of our ethics, economics, sociology and philosophy-could it be
that this sensation of right, as we now experience it, is after all
merely one's private economic advantage, that my sense of right is
one with and inseparable from my sense of gain? In the case of the
murderer his sense of right was admittedly aligned with his economic
advantage. But it is noteworthy that with the attorneys as with the
psychiatrists in the case, their sense of right is also definitely on the
side of their economic interest. Those whom the State pays see the
case with the eyes of the State; that is, their sense of right and
that of the State correspond in toto. While with the lawyers and the
psychiatrists for the defense, their sense of right lies also entirely
on the side from which their fee is to be derived.
It would be absurd to say that men of the highest professional
standing in medicine and the law have testified falsely; that, because
7Gault,

R. H., Criminology, D. C. Heath & Company, 1932, p. 401.
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of the monetary gain to themselves, they have spoken contrary to
their sense of right-to what they believe to be true. On the contrary they have spoken precisely out of their sense of right. That
is my whole point: that where one's advantage, one's economic gain
lies, there lies also one's sense or sensation of right, that what is
called "right" and one's private advantage are one and the same
thing." Now if we do not penalize but on the contrary place a
premium upon this wholly ulterior gain or sensation called "right"
as it is represented socially in the legal and in the scientific expert
with all their professional background of education and culture, what
must be thought of our own sense of right as a State or community
when we apply a different criterion to the sense of right as it is
entertained by the so-called criminal individual when in pursuit of
his private advantage? 9

'II.
This question has arisen not as a personal, philosophical or moral
issue but as the result of a medical and biological inquiry into the
processes determining human relations. It is part of an inquiry
which occupied many years of research into the nature of those
behavior-reactions which I first had occasion to observe as they occur
Our earlier experimental studies
in nervous and mental patients.'
of these inter-individual reactions made plain that crime and neurosis, as they occur in the individual, implicate society at large, that

sf course this external image of private gain may be entirely unconnected with any "material" profit. As often as not this image of one's external right is associated with an abrogation of one's obvious gain. As often
as not it is a mark of "sacrifice" rather than of acquisition. But under whatsoever exterior guise it may appear, it is the image of gain of which I am speaking. It is this secret image of private gain that is everywhere paramount.
9A study in restrospect by Frederick A. Fenning, which appeared in The
American Journal of Psychiatry for July, 1933, gives an interesting summary
of the trial of Charles A. Guiteau who, in 1881, assassinated President Garfield.
He was later convicted and hanged for the crime. In considering the arguments of the defense and the prosecution even in this very brief summary of
Mr. Fenning's, it becomes evident that the weight of opinion today would be
very different from what it was then. The author expresses appreciation of
our greater knowledge of dynamic causations at the present time, thanks to
Freud, and remarks how different the verdict in this case would have been, due
to our added knowledge. In other words, our "right" opinion today would
controvert completely our "right" opinion of a few decades ago. But what would
seem really to require adjustment is this mentally right attitude of the individual
and of the community, with its ever shifting and inconstant determinants. It is
these inconsistencies in our court procedure that point clearly to the need of
establishing a stabilized, scientific criterion which would eliminate such haphazard verdicts as rest upon the "right" opinion either of the individual or the
group.
10 "So-called 'Normal' Socal Relationships Expressed in the Individual and
the Group," American Journal of Psychiatry, 1930, Vol. X, No. 1, pp. 101-116.
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what applies to the negative response of the neurotic with his unbalanced reactions based upon sensations of right and wrong applies
also to the positive response of the criminal with his equally arbitrary and unstabilized sensations of right and wrong. With the progress of investigation the social implications of these studies became
more and more inescapable. Indeed continued studies forced the
conclusion that these social implications were of major importance in
our clinical investigations, demanding the inclusion of normal social
groups as an essential part of the material under investigation."
In general terms the concluding evidence of these studies established a basic connection between spheres of human activity which
in their superficial manifestations have always seemed wholly unrelated, notably, as has been said, between the sphere of man's economic interests and the sphere of his moral or ethical life. Economic
interests as a self-advantageous aim, the identity of competition and
morality or the feeling-synonymity between might and right were
established experimentally as being conditions as characteristic of
the neurotic "invalid" as of the so-called criminal, and these same
parities were found to exist side by side also in the so-called normal
personality. These social implications are further supported. by the
etymological testimony of the folk consciousness where we find that
equity in respect to property (competitive claim) and equity in respect to morality (competitive conduct) are both expressed by the
term or symbol "right."' 12 While within the limits of the present
paper it is not possible to trace the connection between this wholly
external code or sense of "right" and the basic disorder lying back
of it, at least a statement may be made in regard to certain significant
conclusions. Laboratory inquiry into the reactions of individuals socially has shown that such a divisive community-expression as is
presented in the court room is typical of our community or social
attitude throughout society generally, 3 and that the sense of right
commonly involved in our social interchange represents a standard
that is purely imaginable, symbolic and fictitious. 14 It has shown that
llSyz, Hans. "On a Social Approach to Neurotic Conditions." Journal of
Nervous and Mental Disease, December, 1927. Vol. 66, No. 6, pp. 601-615.
...........
"Remarks on Group Analysis," Anerican Journal of
Psychiatry, July, 1928, Vol. VIII, No. 1, pp. 141-148.
l2Compare "I am right"; "I have a right," etc. Morality and acquisition
disclose a common denominator also in the etymological identity of the words
"good" and "goods." (Consider German, gut and giiter; and French, bien and
biens.)
"aConsider such socially "right" alternatives as Jew and Gentile, Catholic
and Protestant,
or the still more poignant contrast Democrat and Republican.
14 "As there are in the United States a New England sense of right and
a Middle-Western sense of right, a Wall Street sense of right and a Western
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this sense of right is purely external, that it has nothing to do with the
inherent biological fitness of the organism as a functioning whole
and that when applied to the tangible, biological processes underlying
human behavior, it proves to be an arbitrary and uncontrollable unit
of measure. 5
The condition of self-contradiction observable in the court room
then is not a localized or isolated condition. It is not specific to this
or that particular setting or circumstance. The condition is one
that is generic and internal. By this I mean that it is a condition
which affects the intrinsic organism of the race. In its quest, therefore, for a remedy, the race must turn to its own organism, to a
study of its own internal processes-not this person to that, or this
class to that class, or this nation to some other nation, nor all nations to a League of Nations busied, as it is, only with external, diplomatic, "mental" inter-relations, but the nations as a whole need
turn to a disorder which is internal to man as a species. They need
as a whole to regard this self-contradiction as an anomaly of development that is resident in man's own intrinsic processes precisely as
we have learned to regard tuberculosis or other pathogenic infections
as community-disorders involving structural changes in the community
tissue. 6
There has always been much speculation regarding the behavior
of man, both external and "introspective," individual and collective,
and it has concerned itself in no small measure with those social
inter-relations which are governed by man's sensations of right and
wrong. But laboratory experimentation has shown that the sensaCoast sense of right, who can know which of these will predominate at any
given moment? Is Mr. Stimson right when he hooks us into the League, or
Senator Borah when he keeps us out of it? Is Mr. Baker right when he
would boycott Japan, or Mr. Lindsay Russell when he would trade with
Japan? Is Mr. Hearst right when he would collect the last sou of the war
debt, or Mr. Hoover, whose emissaries conversed with European diplomats
in the hills and woods and paths of Lausanne informally about the prospects
of cancellation?
"This is not mere difference of opinion among honorable gentlemen; it
is the natural confusion arising from the pursuit of policy which has no
grounding in fact, no relationship to reality, no specific and definable aim,
which is concerned only with the philosophic and undiplomatic concept of the
'good'." George E. Sokolsky, "The American Monkey Wrench," The Atlantic,
December. 1932.
15Galt, William, Phyloanalysis-A Study in the Group or Phyletic Method
of Behavior-Analysis. Psyche Miniature Series, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner
& Company, London, 1933.
16"The Morphology of Insanity as a Racial Process," to be published in a
forthcoming issue of The British Journal of Medical Psychology. Published
in condensed form under the title, "A Phylogenetic Study of Insanity in Its
Underlying Morphology," The Journal of the American Medical Association,
1933, Vol. 100, No. 9, pp. 648-651.
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tions which exist among us as "right" and "wrong" are, with the aid
of a suitable technique, perceptible as the expression of definite physiological strains and tensions within the organism of man as a totality,
just as sensations of pressure, pain or hunger are the expression of
physiological reactions perceptible within the organism of the single
individual. It is the finding of such experimentation, when applied
to physiological sensations and feelings common to the species, that
these inter-individual tensions and strains are traceable to a definite
physiological aberration connected with the process of attention
and that this distortion has occurred in the course of man's mental
evolution as a species." Careful inquiry shows that due to this
racial deflection of attention there does not yet exist among us a
subjectively dependable basis of social integrity, that the moral or
external behavior-reactions of individuals to one another socially are
throughout determined solely by the arbitrary measure represented
in one's personal advantage or sense of right, and that our external
standards of right and wrong called "normal" do not therefore represent a trustworthy, scientific criterion of human behavior. Indeed
it is not too harsh to say that the reason people cherish above all
things this external symbol or formulation called morality is because
this symbol or formulation called morality is of all things the most
readily alterable according to each individual's private right or gain.,,
If then both neurosis and trespass, insanity and crime, are the
direct reflection, socially, of the physiological tensions and strains
that lie back of our normal standards of right and wrong, we are
reversing the direction of scientific inquiry when we seek to investigate the social symptom expressed in crime (whether neurotically
"repressed" or actually "committed") rather than the disturbed
27The experiments to which I refer bear upon special studies in the physiology of attention regarded as a racial process. They refer in particular to the
alteration in the attentive processes which are associated with the over-specialization of the function of the external cranial senses concurrent with the evolution
of man as a social animal and coincident with his invention of language and
ideation. With this specific neural innovation in the process of man's bionomic
relation to the external environment, certain marked changes have been occasioned in his adaptation and development socially, and these changes affect
the feeling-life of the organism in a manner which closely relates them to the
cause of such community phenomena as crime and insanity. (Cf. "Neuropathology and the Internal Environment," paper read at the Twenty-third Annual
Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, Washington, D. C.,
May 11, 1933. To be published.)
1s"Our Mass Neurosis," The Psychological Bulletin, June, 1926, Vol. 23,
No. 6, pp. 305-312.
"The Autonomy of the 'I' from the Standpoint of Group Analysis," Psyche
(London) January, 1928, Vol. VIII, No. 31, pp. 35-50.
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physiological tensions which underlie our normal standards of righi
and wrong.
For this element of rightness exists not only in the criminal
and the neurotic, but there is evidence that every man at all times
does what is "right." What one sees to be one's private advantage
at the moment, whether it consist in committing an act or in refraining from it, is always governed by one's sense of right. It
cannot be too strongly emphasized that the condition is not isolated,
local or sporadic, but that it is social. This situation clearly indicates the urgent need that society, as a social organism, prepare itself
to take fresh inventory of its own processes. That which society
has greatest need to face is precisely that which society is most
strongly bent upon not facing. Society fails to face the fact that the
two least understood classes of individuals within its structure,
namely, the neurotic and the criminal, are precisely the classes who,
of all people, are the most obstinately "right," and society fails to
reckon with these two most right extremes because these two most
right extremes are an expression of the secret "rightness" existing
within the social processes of society itself.1 9
IV.
As in the court room, so throughout the structure of society
generally there are then these two opposed extremes, these two
mutually opposed and competitive forces of "right," and both are
at all times equally right. These two forces do not reflect a "psychic
duality of personality" either in the individual, as we have been
taught, or in society; they represent a divisive element within the
organism of man himself. The present conflict between law and
order and the underworld forces of crime is a world-wide conflict
and it expresses this basic condition of division within man's physiology as a species.20 As with the individual, so with the community,
1oStudents of human behavior have quite generally overlooked the invariable concurrence in one and the same individual of both socially delinquent
and insane trends. They have not recognized how many definitely insane persons there are who have never enacted a delusion, or how many persons of
marked criminal trends who have never committed a crime. This is why so
many insane persons today are occupying cells in prisons and why so many
delinquents are confined in hospitals for the insane,, and why, incidentally, so
many of both these types of personality are moving about in our midst unsuspected of either trend. But the community, with its presumable quota of "normal" individuals, will not be competent to cope consistently with either insanity
or crime until the community has recognized to what extent it combines in itself
of both these disorders.
the germs
20
"The Physiological Basis of Neurosis and Dream," Journal of Social
Psychology, 1930, Vol. I, pp. 48-65.
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it is futile to cry that one side is wrong. "Wrong" is only what
the other side says. It is the reflex rejoinder of rightness in its
obsessive effort to be righter still. The leaders in the industries of
crime have as rigid a sense of right as the proponents of law and
order. They too have their "given word" and covenants, their ideals
of private gain and personal advantage. They too have their symbols
and their codes, their corresponding ceremonials and pseudo-religious
observances, and these rituals are no less pious nor ostentatious in
their social group than these same insignia of rightness expressed
by the leaders of our wider social communities. The inadequacy is
not in the one group as contrasted with the other, but equally in the
attitude of each. The reactions of both are external, mental, divisive.
Each is "right" in contrast to the other who is "wrong." Both represent superficial behavior-adjustments which reflect an identical behavior-code of rightness. Both reflect a divisive social norm which in
turn finds its expression in war and in general economic and industrial
instability. Both, however, are secondary to a distortion of those basic
physiological processes which regulate the attention and adaptation
of man as a unitary organism.
Like the conflict in the court room, the conflict between these
two equally competitive and equally moral behavior-expressions exists because each party is too obsessed with its own symbolic sense
of "right" to permit the community-consciousness, which these two
forces now dominate, to be aware of its own basic disturbance.
Being thus unwittingly opposed to any investigation into the nature
of the real disturbance, these two competitive interests cannot permit
the processes responsible for the external symptoms of social conflict, now represented in insanity, crime and war, to be traced to their
biological source within man's own structure.
If, therefore, what is called "criminal" may be traced to an element in human behavior that is inseparable from this physiologically
spurious sensation reflected inter-individually in the sense of "what
is right;" if, in short, this quality called criminal is inherent in the
artificial social process constitutive of normal behavior, the elaborate
systems for controlling human conduct which come under the head
of educational training, legal psychology and criminology cannot
hope on their present basis to achieve anything of real constructive
value to the State or to the community.
When we consider some of the things we do to one another, as
a community or nation, under the sponsorship of this social password "right," it should not be difficult, even from a quite objective
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view-point (provided we ourselves are not too "right" about it), to
realize the compulsive, pathological nature of this wide-spread system of self-vindication or rightness. Under its aegis we accept
throughout the world systems of government which periodically send
out young men by the hundreds of thousands to kill or maim one
another. It is under the sponsorship of what is "right" that children
are placed in factories where they must work for twelve hours a
day, often engaged in supplementing the operation of machinery
which subjects them to frequent and permanent injuries.21 We authorize a penal system under which an offender may be tortured and
sometimes even beaten to death by his apprehenders before there is
any opportunity of his being brought before the court, and we voice
no concerted protest against a policy of legal diplomacy that secretly
silences in the community any move toward the investigation of such
violations. Under this same system prisoners are subjected to years
of brutal treatment and abuse at the hands of prison guards specially
chosen because of their record as hard-boiled disciplinarians.
In
our "right" notions as to the correct procedure for instilling a sense
of what is "right" into the unfortunate delinquent, and in order to
make sure that he shall adequately expiate his offense and "learn his
lesson," we do not shrink from placing a man in solitary confinement
for a period covering many years! What must be the slow agony
of the gradual disintegrating influence upon the human organism
resulting from the imposition upon it of such biologically abnormal
conditions, none of us accustomed to walk in the free air can even
dimly conceive. Only lately the newspapers reported two instances
in which prisoners had experienced this form of persecution at the
hands of our widely organized social Mafia for engendering in the
community a sense of what is "right."
One of them implored the
court for a sentence of death or life imprisonment rather than risk
being returned again to the horrors of solitary confinement as enforced in his own State from which there was a demand for him.
Incidentally, the other prisoner in explaining to the court the actions
which had led to his arrest, ventured to remark that "None of us is
entirely sane," and added, "You yourself, your Honor, probably are
''
not entirely sane! 2
2
1Ha-ppily. sircc this was written, the manufacturers of cotton textiles and
of other commodities have agreed to include in their codes formulated tinder
the National Tndustrial Recovery Act a clause calling for the forthright elimination
of Child Labor.
2
2Newa York Herald Tribune, July 16. 1932, and The Netc York Times.
November 29, 1932.
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V.
While, as I have said, this is not an attempt to expound a scientific thesis, perhaps the foregoing brief word may be of encouragement to those sociological, students who, having their ear to the
ground, are not unaware of the relatively swift alterations which are
taking place today within the structure of society from the point of
view of man's essential feeling-processes. Anxious and socially "depressed" as we are in the moment, our need is the robust summoning
of man's maturer powers of observation. Not comfort and the
familiar shift from depression to its illusive opposite in the futile
alternative of elation, but a square confronting of the deeper biological actualities that underlie the surface appearances. These actualities now wholly subjective and internal to man need to be made
objective and demonstrable. Our accustomed external sense of right,
our pet habits of thinking and feeling based upon what is called
or symbolized as "right," notwithstanding their age-long impetus and
their wide-spread social distribution, are but a subjective habituation
and constitute no guide to the clear course of behavior-reconstruction
that lies before us.
Man has always been enamored of the obvious, and in our
deference to the obvious we are, in these times of world-strife,
more than ever constrained by our limited and limiting habituations to overlook the possibility of a basic racial health. We tend
to overlook the fact that life was not originally "mental," that for
unreckoned ages man negotiated his world of experience without
the interpolation of the cerebral symbol or of language. We forget
that before the invention of this code of selective signs and symbols,
through which a mentally segregated feature or part is made to stand
as a sign for the whole, there existed for man as a total organism
the total object and its relations. This process as a whole engaged the
feeling of man's organism as a whole. Morality and division had
not yet entered into and caused discord and dissension within the
intrinsic feeling-life of man. Truth, as a mental concept, had not
taken possession and usurped control of man's behavior.2 3 In the
process, however, of our mental or social evolution and in its gradual
interpolation of this segregated part or divisive element, that is, with
man's attainment of an external, symbolic knowledge of good and
evil, or with his acquirement of a "sense of right," there has oc2
3For evidence of the etymological synonymity between sin and truth, see
paper by the author, "The Origin of the Incest-Awe," The Psychoanalytic Review, July, 1918, Vol. V, No. 3, p. 250.
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curred a conflict at the very heart of man's feeling. It is this irreconcilable anomaly in the process of man's growth that is answerable
for the deflection of his total and unified attention as a social organism and the consequent substitution of a social image of rightness
for the integral functioning of man as an organized social unit.
Life with us now is so much more a matter of adjusting the
symbols that represent conduct than an expression of the biological
processes that are conduct. We are so much more concerned with
problems of understanding, than with problems of behavior-with
problems that attempt to cope with behavior as a mental picture or
concept rather than with behavior itself. But behavior is a problem
of the total organism which no localized, picture-forming function
or mental part of the organism is competent to resolve. Physiological
unity and health are primary and basic to the race. The accident
that has induced in man a divisive and competitive element and has
split the feeling or interest of the integral social body into as many
parts as there are individuals or groups of individuals composing the
species is but a temporary faux pas-a lapse of development in the
course of our growth as conscious creative organisms. However
prevalent, however powerful socially the sense of right as a sense of
purely personal, private, segregated interests, there is within the
race an equally powerful, biological trend that makes for a healthy,
whole and impartial adaptation among us. There is within man's
physiological organism as a race a basic health or fitness that cannot
be wholly extinguished-a health or fitness in contrast with which
this external symbol called "right" with all its attending pathology
may be recognized as a false and uneconomic substitution.
In closing, may I offer the suggestion that the social tension entailed in the aberrations of sensation symbolized as "right and wrong"
and their demonstrable physiological basis are of significance not only
to the field of medicine and biology but also in their bearing upon
sociology, criminology, economics and the law. As long as we preserve as a presumably dependable measure of human conduct this
illusive and variable sense of right that is now the basis of our social
and political acquisitiveness, of our economic and industrial competi,ion, of our personal and national greeds, it is not possible to bring to
the regulation and adjustment of human affairs the scientific stability
of a tested and controlled criterion. Until we have applied in the
sphere of our human processes a technique of observation identical
with that prevailing in the laboratories of structural biology else-
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where, it is not possible for man to restore the basic health of func24
tion natural to his organism as an integral racial process.
24Since this article was submitted for publication (September, 1932) the
representatives of forty-six nations have gathered in London for the purpose
of a World Economic Conference. From the reports of its proceedings, nothing could more faithfully reproduce the reflex pattern of social interreactions
observable objectively under the controlled conditions of inquiry offered in the
laboratory of phyloanalysis. Each representative inevitably voices only his point
of view-the right or advantage of his nation or interest. So that, in reviewing
the personal and social currents that prevail in such international parleys,
evidence would seem to point to the existence of the same obstacle to an
understanding among nations as exists among individuals. As we consider the
underlying mood that characterizes our world conferences, it would seem that
nations too, as well as individuals, however earnest and well-meaning, are
inevitably balked in their efforts to reach an organic agreement among them.
The impasse we found existing in the private advantage secretly preserved in
the arbitrary right of the individual apparently exists also among aggregates
of individuals and defeats no less their efforts to reach a sound and stabilized
basis of intercommunication. Like tuberculosis or insanity, this ineptness of
accord is an anomaly affecting the species in its innermost processes, and
physiological processes which are internal to us can not be reached and altered
by external argument or covenant.

